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PAlAZZOLO AND THE DECLINE OF 
JUSTICE SCALIA'S CATEGORICAL 
TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* 
Abstract: This Article maintains that despite the fact that the Palazzolo 
decision gave the landowner victories by relaxing ripeness hurdles to 
filing takings cases and rejecting the government's "notice rule"-under 
which the existence of preexisting regulations would defeat takings 
claims-the chief significance of the case is the Court's signal that it will 
reject attempts to expand categorical rules in takings cases. According 
to this view, Palazollo will be remembered for the decline of Justice 
Scalia's categorical approach to takings, as reflected in his Lucas 
opinion, and for the triumph of multi-factor balancing championed by 
Justice Brennan's Penn Central opinion. A postscript to the Article 
contends that the Court's Tahoe-Sierra decision, decided while the 
Article was in press, confirms these predictions. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island l was a 
disappointment for all concerned. Palazzolo, of course, got the satis-
faction of knowing that his case liberalized the law of ripeness in tak-
ings cases and also destroyed the government defense based on the 
so-called "notice rule," the claim that acquisition of property after en-
actment of a regulation bars a takings claim based on that regulation. 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College. I thank 
Dean James Huffman, Professor Bill Funk, and the students at Lewis and Clark for the 
well-attended debate we had on the significance of the Pa1m:.zolo decision in November 
2001, which focused my thinking on this issue. I also thank Tim Dowling of the Commu-
nity Rights Counsel, who provided me several outlines prepared for a Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center conference on the takings issue, which helped me prepare for the debate. 
Particularly helpful was the outline of Professor Richard Lazarus, the preeminent envi-
ronmental law analyst of the Supreme Court. See generally Richard j. Lazarus, Restaring 
What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703 
(2000); Richard j. Lazarus, Understanding Palazzolo and Its Significance for Tahoe-Sierra, 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Washington, D.C.), Oct. 18-19, 
200l. Finally, thanks to Bill Warnock,j.D. 2003, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and 
Clark College, for help with the footnotes. 
1533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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But while these results undoubtedly pleased Palazzolo's Pacific Legal 
Foundation2 attorneys, he is unlikely ever to collect a dime, as the 
question of whether he has a compensable claim is now back in the 
Rhode Island courts, which were decidedly unenthusiastic about his 
initial claim.3 
The State lost on the ripeness issue and, more significantly, on 
the notice rule, depriving it of an important categorical defense to 
takings claims.4 It is unlikely, however, that the State will have to com-
pensate Palazzolo because the Court refused the landowner's invita-
tion to conceptually sever the wetlands at issue, which were burdened 
by the State's regulation, from his adjacent unburdened uplands. 
Consequently, the Court overwhelmingly rejected Palazollo's claim 
that the State's denial of a permit to fill the wetlands amounted to a 
categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4 be-
cause his uplands retained substantial economic value.5 
2 The Pacific Legal Foundation is a public interest law firm dedicated to advancing 
property rights, free enterprise, and individual liberty. See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall &: Char-
les P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment 0/ the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. 
ENvn.. AFF. L. REv. 509, 539-42 (1998). 
5 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A No. 86-1496, 1997 WL 1526546, at *4-5 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997) (finding that the government action was not a taking be-
cause the wetlands development would constitute a nuisance; there were adjacent uplands 
available for development that were not burdened by the regulatory restriction; and there 
was no interference with the landowner's reasonable expectations due to his knowledge of 
the State's regulations when he acquired the property), affd on other grounds sub nom. 
Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A2d 707 (R.I. 2000) (finding that the case was not 
ripe and thus no taking occurred because: (1) the landowner failed to submit an applica-
tion for the development for which he sought compensation; (2) notice of the regulations 
at the time of property acquisition defeated the landowner's claim; and (3) the uplands 
provided the landowner with an economically viable use), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, re-
manded sUb nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
4 SeeJohn D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment o/Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 Envtl. 
L. Rep. 11,112, 11,113 (2001) ("This ruling represents a setback for government defen-
dants and destroys one of the few bright-line rules in an otherwise muddled area of the 
law."); Robert Meltz, What Rok Does the Law Existing When a Property is Acquired Have in Ana-
lyzing a Later Taking Claim': The "Notice Ruk," in INvERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED 
GoVERNMENT LIABIUTY 381, 383, 385 (A.L.I.-A.B.A COURSE OF STUDY, May 3, 2001), 
availabk in Westlaw, SF64 ALI-ABA 381 ("No regulatory taking occurs when the govern-
ment restricts a property use under a law existing when the property was acquired-or 
under law whose adoption after acquisition was foreseeable. This government defense has 
been called the 'notice rule,' because the land buyer is seen as being 'on notice' as to the 
possibility of being thwarted, and hence not deserving of compensation .... The older a 
law, the fewer property owners exist who acquired before the law-hence, under the no-
tice rule, the smaller the universe of potential takings plaintiffs. "). 
5505 U.S. 1003,1015 (1992). Under Lucas, regulations which completely deprive bur-
dened realty of all economic value are categorical compensable takings. Id. 
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Thus, the Palazzolo result was decidedly a split decision. However, 
the language in the Court's six opinions6 arguably signals that the 
categorical approach to takings cases championed by Justice Scalia in 
his Lucas decision no longer commands a majority of the Court. 
Therefore, the Lucas rule is likely to be confined to a narrow category 
of cases where landowners can demonstrate that a regulatory restric-
tion unreasonably imposes a complete economic wipeout. The 
Court's aversion to deciding takings cases on the basis of categorical 
rules means that the dominant litmus test for the merits of takings 
claims will be the balancing test announced by Justice Brennan in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 7 Since government 
defendants historically fare well under this test, Palazzolo may come to 
be seen as an important turning point in takings jurisprudence. 
This theory will soon be tested. This term, the Court will decide 
the Lake Tahoe moratorium case.s If I am right about the significance 
of Palazzolo, the Court will reject the landowners' attempt to obtain 
compensation due to the moratorium, since it is grounded on a cate-
gorical claim. If I am wrong, the validity of this comment will be short-
lived. (The Court handed down its decision in the Lake Tahoe case 
while this Article was in press. The decision, which largely validated 
the prediction about the decline injustice Scalia's approach, is briefly 
discussed in the Postscript.) 
I. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CATEGORICAL RULE IN LUCAS 
In the Lucas case, now fifteen years old, Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion seemed to herald in a new era for landowners burdened with 
6 See generally 533 U.S. 606 (2001). Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, which was 
six to three on the ripeness issue and five to four on the notice issue. Justice Stevens con-
curred on the ripeness issue but dissented on the notice issue. [d. at 637-45 (Stevens, j., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor concurred in the result but made 
clear that while the notice issue could not categorically defeat a takings claim, it was a rele-
vant consideration under the balancing test for the existence of a taking under the Court's 
decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). [d. at 
632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurrence vigorously disputed the 
relevance of notice under the Penn Central balancing test. [d. at 636-37 (Scalia,j., concur-
ring). Justice Ginsberg wrote a dissent on the ripeness issue, joined by Justices Souter and 
Breyer. [d. at 645-54 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,lJ. dissenting).Justice Breyer also wrote a 
separate dissent cautioning against landowners manufacturing takings claims due to trans-
fers which separate a parcel's developable portions from its restricted portions. [d. at 654-
55 (Breyer,]., concurring). 
7438 U.S. at 135-36. 
8 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764 (9th 
Cir. 2000), afl'd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
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regulations. As the first decision of the Supreme Court to find a regu-
latory taking in over sixty years, and only the second ever,9 Lucas held 
that landowners were due compensation if a regulation deprived 
them of all economic value.10 Justice Scalia analogized such complete 
economic wipeouts to permanent physical occupations, which the 
Court had held to be categorical takings ten years before Lucas in the 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. case, which involved a 
comparatively insignificant cable television wire that no doubt in-
creased the value of the landowner's property.ll Justice Scalia sug-
gested that from the landowner's point of view a "total deprivation of 
beneficial use is ... the equivalent of a physical appropriation. "12 
The creation of categorical takings is of great benefit to takings 
plaintiffs because government defendants cannot defeat such claims 
by a case-specific inquiry into the public interest supporting the regu-
latory burden.13 In fact, the categories create per se takings. On the 
other hand, if a claim does not fall within the permanent physical in-
9 The grandfather of regulatory takings cases is, of course, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma-
Iwn, in which Justice Holmes wrote for an eight-member majority, concluding that there 
could be a regulatory taking if a regulation went "too far. " 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). There 
was such a taking in Malwn, according to Holmes, although precisely why has never been 
entirely clear. He suggested that the legislation was protecting only the private interest of a 
single overlying landowner, but of course the statute aimed to protect many similarly-
situated landowners. Id. at 413. He also emphasized that regulations which substantially 
diminished the value of land went "too far." See id. at 413, 415. I have always thought that 
Holmes found a taking in Mahon because the state legislation prohibiting subsidence due 
to mining activities under houses and other vulnerable sites seemed to obliterate a bargain 
between the coal company and Mahon's predecessor, in which the coal company sold the 
surface while expressly reserving for itself the mineral and support estates. See id. at 394-
95. Thus, the legislation appeared to completely revise private, bargained-for rights. Justice 
Brandeis wrote a vigorous dissent in Malwn, in which he claimed that there could be no 
regulatory taking where a regulation merely prevented nuisance-like activity, such as pro-
ducing subsidence of an overlying dwelling, because the miner lacked the authority to 
maintain a nuisance. Id. at 417 (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
10 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18. Restrictions that "inhere[d] in the title itself, in the re-
strictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already 
place upon land ownership," were excepted from this "total economic wipeout amounts to 
a compensable taking" rule. Id. at 1029. 
B See generaUy 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
12 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 
U.S. 621, 652 (Brennan,]., dissenting»; id. (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES of 
the Laws of England, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812) (1797» ("[F]or what is the land but the 
profits thereof[?]"). For one response to Justice Scalia's use of Coke's language, see Mi-
chael C. Biumm, Property Myths, judicial Activism, and the Lucas Case, 23 ENVTL. L. 907, 916 
(1993), stating that "[m]ost obviously, land involves privacy as well as development rights. 
And it is those rights that the Supreme Court ought to be concerned about zealously pro-
tecting from governmental regulations, not development rights like Mr. Lucas." 
13 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
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vasion and complete economic wipeout categories, the Penn Central 
multi-factor balancing governs, in which the general good served by 
the regulation is balanced against the burden imposed on the land-
owner,14 Government defendants have generally fared well under 
Penn Central balancing. 
Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas was the subject of spirited com-
mentary.15 Admirers saw it as a long-overdue recognition of the need 
to compensate overburdened landowners. Detractors viewed it as a 
threat to legitimate land use and environmental regulations designed 
to "adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic life for the com-
mon good. "16 Despite the predictions that Lucas represented a sea-
change in takings law, the case had surprisingly little effect on the 
lower courts, with the exception of the Federal Circuit.l7 I believe that 
the Palazzolo decision means that the Lucas legacy will continue to be 
small, since a clear majority of the Court seems quite uncomfortable 
with the categorical approach to deciding takings cases. 
II. THE PALAZZOLO DECISION 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion addressed three issues: (1) 
whether the case was ripe; (2) whether Palazzolo's claim was barred by 
the fact that he acquired title to the land after the wetland restrictions 
were in place; and (3) whether there was a Lucas-type categorical tak-
ing as a result of the State's denial of a permit to fill the wetlands. I 
want to emphasize the latter two issues, since they pertain to the de-
cline of the categorical approach to takings analysis. However, the first 
issue warrants mention, as it concerns how easily takings claimants 
may access federal courts. 
14 Under Penn Central balancing, the Court conducts an ad hoc factual inquiry into the 
particular circumstances of each case, examining: (1) the character of the governmental 
action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the landowner; and (3) any interfer-
ence with reasonable investment-backed expectations. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
15 See, e.g., Colloquium on Lucas, 23 ENVTL. L. 869,869-932 (1993); Symposium on Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1369, 1369-1455 (1993). 
16 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
17 On the rather insignificant legacy of Lucas, see infra note 77. On the Federal Cir-
cuit's takings jurisprudence, see Kendall & Lord, supra note 2, at 558-61, 566-71, 576-80. 
See generally Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law7: Libertarian Property, Natural 
Law, and the Just Compensation Clo,use in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171 (1995). 
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A. The Ripeness Ruling 
The majority determined that the case was ripe-the primary 
reason why the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled against Palaz-
zolo18-because the State had made it clear, to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, that it would not allow any development on the eighteen 
acres of wetlands that Palazzolo owned.19 Thus, there was no need to 
submit an application for a smaller development of the wetlands, nor 
was there a need to submit any application at all concerning his two 
acres of upland property.20 
The latter ruling drew a sharp dissent from Justice Ginsberg, who 
accused Palazzolo's Pacific Legal Foundation attorneys of employing a 
"bait-and-switch maneuver," a con game of "mov[ing] the pea to a dif-
ferent shell," by arguing for the first time before the Supreme Court 
that there was a taking under the multi-factor Penn Central test.21 Pre-
viously, in the state courts, Palazzolo argued only for a Lucas-type tak-
ing, based on denial of all economic use.22 The effect of this switch 
was to make highly relevant the amount of development permitted on 
Palazzolo's uplands, which previously was not an issue, since all the 
State had to argue to defeat a Lucas claim was that at least one home 
could be built on the uplands. Palazzolo's attorneys disingenuously 
claimed in their petition for certiorari that Palazzolo was restricted to 
one home on the uplands.23 Yet the Supreme Court majority ruled 
that because the State had not challenged Palazzolo's inaccurate as-
sertion, the State inadvertently waived any objection to this false 
claim.24 This was too much for Justice Ginsberg, who warned, "[t]his 
Court's waiver ruling thus amounts to an unsavory invitation to un-
scrupulous litigants: Change your theory and misrepresent the record 
in your petition for certiorari; if the respondent fails to note your 
18 Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I. 2000), a/I'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
19 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 619 (2001). In fact, Palazzolo never even 
submitted an application for the seventy-four house development for which he sought 
compensation. However, the Court ruled that while that failure was relevant to the amount 
of compensation due Palazzolo, it was irrelevant to the ripeness issue. Id. at 624. 
20 Id. at 625-26. 
21 Id. at 653 (Ginsberg, Souter & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). 
22 Tavares, 746 A.2d at 716. 
2$ See TAKINGS WATCH (Community Rights Counsel, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2001, at 
2, available at http://communityrights.org/takingswatchnewsletter /newsletter.asp. 
24 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, 623. 
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machinations, you have created a different record on which this 
Court will review the case. "25 
Palazzolo's victory on the ripeness issue generated headlines.26 
While a disturbing result, since it seemed to authorize litigants to cre-
ate "facts" through assertions in petitions for certiorari,27 actually the 
case should affect ripeness doctrine very little.28 The Court observed, 
for example, that a land use authority may, prior to being subjected to 
a takings court challenge, "use[] its own reasonable procedures ... to 
decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation. "29 The Court 
also noted that "[t]he mere allegation of entitlement to the value of 
an intensive use will not avail the landowner if the project would not 
have been allowed under other existing, legitimate land use limita-
tions. "30 Perhaps more significantly, the Court limited its ruling to 
federal ripeness principles, acknowledging that state ripeness or ex-
haustion rules may impose requirements beyond federal rules.31 So, 
quite conceivably, on remand the Rhode Island Supreme Court could 
have affirmed its earlier decision and ruled that the case was not ripe, 
but this time clarify that it was relying on state principles of ripeness, 
instead of remanding the case to the superior court.32 
B. The Notice Ruling 
For years government defendants employed two categorical de-
fenses to defeat takings claims without case-specific factual inquiries 
into the benefits and burdens of challenged regulations. First was the 
allegation that the proposed development was a nuisance-like activity. 
25 [d. at 653 (Ginsberg, Souter & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). 
26 See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Expanding the Protections of the Takings Clause, 
mAL, Sept. 1,2002; Martha Coyle, Landoumers Win Right to Attack Rules, NAT'L LJ.,July 9, 
2001, at http://www.nlj.com/archive/2001 /back/0716.html. 
27 One lesson from Palazzolo would of course be that government defendants must 
carefully peruse the certiorari petitions of takings claimants for factual errors and correct 
them in their responses. 533 U.S. at 652-54 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,lJ., dissenting). 
28 See Echevarria, supra note 4, at 11,115 (noting that the Court reaffirmed Williamson 
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985». 
29 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620. 
30 [d. at 625. John Echevarria concluded that "[ t] his language strongly suggests that a 
regulatory action that might otherwise result in a taking will not be found to be one if the 
decision is independently supported by the applicant's failure to comply with other, fa-
cially valid regulatory requirements." Echevarria, supra note 4, at 11,115. 
31 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625-26. 
32 Cf Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 785 A.2d 561, 561 (R.1. 2001) (order remanding 
the case to the superior court and directing counsel to submit further memoranda). 
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This per se exception for nuisance liability was discarded by Justice 
Scalia's 1987 Lucas opinion, where he stated: 
When it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" 
was merely our early formulation of the police power 
justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any 
regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction be-
tween regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which 
"confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on 
an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-evident that 
noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish 
regulatory "takings"-which require compensation-from 
regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.33 
Thus, government defendants lost one of their categorical defenses. 
The second categorical defense was the notice rule, under which 
notice of preexisting regulations barred takings claims. The thinking 
was that preexisting regulations "inhered" in the title under Lucas, 
and thus were immune from takings liability. The Palazzolo Court re-
jected the categorical notice rule, by a five to four vote.34 According to 
Justice Kennedy, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's endorsement of a 
"blanket rule" that post-enactment acquisition of property bars tak-
ings claim went too far, putting "a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean 
bundle" of property rights.35 The Court concluded that such a blanket 
rule against compensation would create unfair results for older land-
owners and those who must sell their land (as opposed to those who 
can afford to retain the land and litigate}.36 Although the Court's rul-
SS Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 V.S. 1003, 1026 (1992). 
S4 Justice Stevens, who provided the sixth vote for the majority on the ripeness issue, 
dissented on the notice rule. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 V.S. 606, 637-38 (2001) (Stev-
ens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
S5 Id. at 626-27. Perhaps the blanket rule went too far under the unusual facts of the 
Palo:aolo case. Denying compensation because of the notice rule seemed harsh because 
Palazzolo's corporation owned the wetlands at issue prior to the enactment of the regula-
tion that banned most development See id. Palazzolo acquired the land as an individual 
due to the dissolution of the corporation after the State promulgated the regulation. Id. So 
he possessed post-enactment title only due to the operation of state law, not due to a tradi-
tional conveyance. Id.Justice Breyer's dissent suggested that an inheritance is another kind 
of transfer that should not always bar a takings claim, since such a transfer-unlike a bar-
gained-for sale-rarely changes expectations. See id. at 654-55 (Breyer, j., dissenting). On 
the other hand, Justice O'Connor noted that sales often change expectations, especially 
where the sale price is discounted due to regulations, and that expectations are highly 
relevant to a takings analysis. See id. at 632-33 (O'Connor,j., concurring). 
S6 Id. at 627. The Court noted that "[fluture generations, too, have a right to challenge 
unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land." Id. 
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ing on ripeness may have generated headlines, its rejection of the no-
tice rule was more significant. The result will be to force government 
defendants to defend their regulations on the merits. 
The good news for government defendants is that the Court's 
rejection of the notice rule does not necessarily mean that pre-
acquisition notice is irrelevant in takings analysis. Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence, which provided the decisive fifth vote on the notice is-
sue,37 made clear that the time of Palazzolo's acquisition of the wet-
lands was a relevant consideration in determining whether there was a 
taking under Penn Centrafs multi-factor analysis. She wrote that it 
"would be just as much error to expunge this consideration from the 
takings inquiry as it would be to accord it exclusive significance."38 
This is because, according to Justice O'Connor, the regulatory regime 
in place at the time of land acquisition "helps to shape the reason-
ableness of [the claimant's] expectations" under the Penn Central test, 
for "if existing regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then 
some property owners may reap windfalls and an important indicium 
of fairness is lost. "39 Justice O'Connor's perspective is a majority view, 
as the four dissenters expressly joined her.40 
Moreover, it is hardly clear that notice of preexisting regulations 
is not a relevant factor even in the context of Lucas-type takings 
claims. The Court of course did not address this issue since, as dis-
cussed below, it rejected Palazzolo's allegation of a Lucas-type eco-
nomic wipeout. But Justice Kennedy's majority opinion seemed to 
leave the door open by observing that there are qualifications on the 
notion that regulations producing economic wipeouts require com-
pensation. Citing his own concurrence in Lucas, Justice Kennedy fur-
ther opined that economic wipeouts warranted compensation only 
where the regulatory deprivation is contrary to reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations.41 If, for example, Palazzolo sold only his 
wetland acres to a purchaser with notice of the regulatory restrictions, 
the buyer would lack reasonable, investment-backed expectations. Jus-
tice O'Connor clearly was concerned about the manufacturing of 
37 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
38 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-33 (O'Connor,]., concuning). 
391d. at 635 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
40 See id. at 633 (O'Connor,]., concurring); id. at 643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens,]., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,jJ., dissenting); id. 
at 654-55 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
41 ld. at 617 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Ken-
nedy,]., concurring». 
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such economic windfalls.42 And Justice Breyer, the only Justice to ad-
dress the issue directly, stated that he could not see how such strategic 
transfers could warrant just compensation.43 
Thus, though it will no longer be an absolute bar to takings 
claims, notice of preexisting regulations will remain a factor in most 
takings claims. Furthermore, the multi-factor Penn Central test will not 
be reduced to a mere balancing between the importance of the public 
good served by the regulation and the economic burden imposed on 
the landowner.44 Instead, the test will continue to consider whether 
the landowner acquired the property with knowledge of the regula-
tory restrictions.45 The Court's preservation of the notice rule in this 
context will supply an important governmental defense to takings 
claims, even if it no longer completely defeats them. Recognizing this 
fact, Justice Scalia took issue with Justice O'Connor's siding with the 
dissenters. He argued that the timing of property acquisition should 
never be a relevant factor under Penn Central unless a preexisting 
regulation had become part of the "background" principles of state 
law that, under his Lucas opinion, always defeated a takings claim.46 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the total demise of the notice rule 
would enable savvy developers to secure unfair windfalls by buying 
land at discounted prices due to restrictions they intended to chal-
lenge as takings. He viewed this as a price worth paying to ensure 
against the government's use of unconstitutional regulations.47 No 
other Justice agreed with Justice Scalia on this issue. 
The continued relevance of notice of preexisting regulations, de-
spite the demise of the notice rule, is significant for my purpose be-
cause it reflects the Court's disillusionment with categorical, bright-
line rules in the takings context. The Court dispensed with the notice 
rule as a categorical trump to takings claims, but it was unwilling to 
endorse Justice Scalia's notion that notice of preexisting regulations is 
42 Id. at 632 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
43 Id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I do not see how a constitutional provision 
concerned with fairness and justice could reward any such strategic behavior."). 
44 See supra notes 14 (summarizing the Penn Central test). 
45 See supra note 41-43 and accompanying text. 
46 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia,]., concurring) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029); 
see supra note 10 (explaining the "background principles" exception to Lucas takings). 
Justice Scalia first advanced the notion that pre-acquisition notice of restrictions was irrele-
vant for takings purposes in Nollan v. Califarnia Coastal Commission. 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 
(1987) ("So long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior owners of the 
easement without compensating them, the prior owners must be understood to have trans-
ferred their full property rights in conveying their lots. ") . 
47 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
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irrelevant.48 The Court's dissatisfaction with categorical rules in the 
takings context extends both to rules favoring the government-like 
the nuisance exception and the notice rule-and those favoring 
landowners-like the Lucas economic wipeout rule, which I believe 
will continue to be narrowly construed. As Justice O'Connor ex-
plained, "[t]he temptation to adopt what amounts to per se rules in 
either direction must be resisted. "49 It seems to me that this sentiment 
signals a triumph of Justice Brennan's Penn Central "ad hocracy" and 
the demise of Justice Scalia's categorical approach under Lucas. 
C. The Size of the Property Ruling 
The size of the property under consideration, also known as the 
"denominator issue," is the key remaining unresolved issue in takings 
jurisprudence.5o This determination is directly related to the availabil-
ity of categorical, Lucas-type takings claims, because the smaller the 
size of the property, the easier it is to allege a regulatory economic 
wipeout. The size of the property is also relevant in the Penn Central 
multi-factor claims because the size of the property determines a 
regulatory restriction's economic impact, in particular whether there 
has been a significant diminution of value. 51 
Prior to Palazzolo, the Supreme Court seemed to have adopted a 
broad view of the relevant property size. In Penn Central, where the 
Court refused to consider the air space above Grand Central Terminal 
as relevant property, Justice Brennan's opinion stated, 
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into 
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights 
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In de-
ciding whether a particular governmental action has 
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the 
character of the [government] action and on the nature and 
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole 
52 
48 See id. at 626. 
49Id. at 636 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
50 See generally Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUT-
GERS LJ. 663 (1996). 
51 For the Penn Central factors see supra note 14. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922), first articulated the "significant diminution of 
value" test. 
52 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
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Applying this principle later in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De-
Benedictis, the Court rejected the coal company's takings claim in part 
by refusing to view the relevant property as merely the restricted coal 
for purposes of analyzing a regulatory restriction.5s Nevertheless, the 
Court has not been entirely clear on the issue. In his Lucas opinion, 
Justice Scalia suggested that the state court's view of the relevant size 
of the property in Penn Centra&-including other property that the 
claimant owned in the vicinity-was "extreme" and "unsupportable, "54 
which seemed to be a direct contradiction of the Keystone reasoning. 
Palazzolo asked the Court to consider the relevant property to be 
only his eighteen acres of wetlands, not including his two adjacent 
acres of wetlands. By "conceptually severing" the property in this 
manner,55 he hoped to convince the Court that the regulation worked 
a complete economic wipeout, warranting compensation under Lu-
cas. The Court refused.56 According to Justice Kennedy, because 
Palazzolo's uplands retained substantial development value (the trial 
court determined the uplands were worth $200,000), there was no 
deprivation of all economic use.57 With more than a "token" interest 
retained, there was no categorical taking. 58 Since Palazzolo claimed 
that the developed value of his property was worth $3.15 million,59 a 
93.6% loss in value was not sufficient to invoke the Lucas categorical 
rule. In fact, none of the Court's six opinions suggested that this 
magnitude of loss was sufficient to trigger a Lucas taking. 
Despite the consistency of the Palazzolo result with the reasoning 
in Penn Central and Keystone on the relevant size of the property, Jus-
tice Kennedy's language was quite ambivalent about the issue.60 He 
noted that Palazzolo only raised the conceptual severance issue before 
the U.S. Supreme Court; it was not argued in the state courts.61 For 
this reason the Court presumed that the entire parcel was the basis for 
!i3 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987) ("The 27 million tons of coal [required to be left in place 
by the state subsidence control statute] do not constitute a separate segment of property 
for takings law purposes. ") . 
54 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
55 The term originated in MargaretJane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross 
Currents in theJurisprudenceofTakings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988). 
56 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001). 
57Id. 
58 Id. at 631. 
59 Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A2d 710, 715 (RI. 2000), afi'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
60 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001). 
61 Id. at 631. 
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the takings claim.62 Moreover, Justice Kennedy referred to the size of 
the property issue as a 
difficult, persisting question of what is the proper denomina-
tor in the takings fraction. Some of our cases indicate that 
the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is 
measured against the value of the parcel as a whole, but we 
have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of this 
rule, a sentiment echoed by some commentators.63 
This equivocation may signal that some members of the Court are 
ready to overturn Penn Central (a six to three decision) and Keystone (a 
five to four decision) on the size of the property issue.64 Such a recon-
sideration would be revolutionary, perhaps ratifying the partial tak-
ings theory adopted by Judge Plager of the Federal Circuit, and in the 
process casting a cloud over much environmental and land use regu-
lation.65 But given the close link between the size of the property issue 
and the categorical approach to takings analysis, the Court's rather 
clear rejection of the latter in Palazzolo makes a revolution in the size 
of the property seem unlikely. 
III. The Decline of Justice Scalia's Categorical Approach 
Justice Scalia has been advocating revolutionary changes in the 
takings doctrine since his appointment to the Court in 1986.66 This is 
a fairly remarkable development, for it belies his claimed fidelity to 
62 [d. at 631-32. 
6~ [d. at 631 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. 
REv. 1, 16-17 (1987) and John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory 
Takings Claims, 61 V. CHI. L. REv. 1535 (1994». 
64 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy did seem to resolve 
one issue lingering since Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion, in which he had suggested that 
"background principles" of state property and nuisance law immune from takings claims 
were limited to common law rules. 505 V.S. 1003, 1004 (1992); see supra note 10. Justice 
Kennedy clearly indicated that statutes could form such background principles. Although 
he declined to suggest when legislation could become a background principle sufficient to 
defeat a takings claim, he did provide a kind of "equal protection" gloss to takings analysis 
by positing that "[a] regulation cannot be a background principle for some owners but not 
for others." Pala:a.olo, 533 V.S. at 630. 
65 See Kendall & Lord, supra note 2, at 566-71. See generally Blumm, supra note 17, at 
177-82, 192-98 (condemning the partial takings approach); James L. Huffman, Judge 
Plager's "Sea Change" in Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 597 (1995) (praising 
the Plager approach); Jay Plager, Takings Law and Appellate Decision Making, 25 ENVTL. L. 
161 (1995). 
66 See Kendall & Lord, supra note 2, at 539, 555-58. 
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originalism.67 In his first term, Justice Scalia wrote the Court's opinion 
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, in which he ruled that a 
condition in a building permit requiring the landowner to dedicate to 
the state a beach access easement worked a taking.68 Thus, he adopted 
a narrow view of the property at issue, disaggregating the landowner's 
right to exclude, which the state wanted dedicated, from the devel-
opment rights the landowner sought from the state.69 He also sug-
gested, in that opinion, that notice of preexisting regulations was ir-
relevant to a takings claim.7o 
Five years later, in Lucas, Justice Scalia created a new per se cate-
gorical taking concerning regulations producing economic wipeouts, 
as explained in Part I supra. What is noteworthy here is that Scalia's 
opinion was not joined by Justice Kennedy, so Justice Scalia wrote only 
for five Justices, one of whom, Justice White, has since retired.71 Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lucas complained that Justice 
Scalia's resurrection of common law nuisance as the paradigm "back-
ground principle" insulated from takings compensation would erect a 
"static body of property law" ill-equipped for protecting fragile ecosys-
tems.72 Moreover, Justice Kennedy maintained that a categorical tak-
ing could not be grounded only on a regulation producing an eco-
67 Justice Scalia reiterated his professed dedication to original intent in a recent dedi-
cation of a new building at my law school. See Shelby Oppel & Paige Parker, Scalia Sticks 
with the Original in Constitutional Controversy, OREGONIAN, Feb. 11, 2002, at Bl (lamenting 
that originalists like himself are a minority on the bench and discussing several originalist 
issues but ignoring his takings jurisprudence). Of course, there is no original intent that 
the Takings Clause would apply to regulations, see generally William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 
(1995), a fact that Justice Scalia acknowledged in his Lucas opinion. See 505 U.S. at 1028 
n.15; see also Kendall & Lord, supra note 2, at 515-16 n.16 (collecting other commentary 
on the nonoriginalist origins of the recent expansion in the Takings Clause). 
The irony of Justice Scalia dedicating a building which won environmental awards at a 
leading environmental law school was not lost on many, as over 450 people from twenty • 
different environmental, civil rights, and social justice groups demonstrated against him 
and the prospect that President Bush would do as he promised and nominate like-minded 
Justices. See Rally for Justice, at http://www.rallyforjustice.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2002). 
68 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987). 
69 Id. at 832-33. 
70 Id. at 833 n.2; see supra note 46. 
71 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomasjoined injustice 
Scalia's Lucas opinion. 505 U.S. 1003, 1005 (1992). 
72Id. at 1035 (Kennedy,]., concurring) ("In my view, reasonable expectations must be 
understood in light of our whole legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is too nar-
row a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent soci-
ety. "). 
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nomic wipeout; the regulation had to frustrate reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations as welL's 
In Palazzolo, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court repeatedly 
emphasized the need to judge regulatory restrictions on a reason-
ableness basis,74 the antithesis of the kind of categorical rule favored 
by Justice Scalia. Moreover, Justice Kennedy not only made clear that 
statutes could form background principles,75 he also confined the Lu-
cas categorical rule to situations in which a regulation left land "eco-
nomically idle. "76 In so doing, he ratified the interpretation of most 
lower courts that the Lucas rule of per se compensation is an ex-
tremely narrow one.77 For example, one recent court concluded that 
there was no Lucas-type taking where a dune protection law forbade 
any development but the undeveloped property retained value for 
"parking, picnics, barbecues, and other recreational uses. "78 
Worse, from Justice Scalia's perspective, Justice O'Connor's con-
currence specifically endorsed the kind of balancing implicit in a rea-
sonableness approach to takings analysis.79 And she expressly rejected 
Justice Scalia's categorical approach, writing that such "per se rules ... 
must be resisted."80 Without Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, the coa-
lition of Justices that enabled Justice Scalia to author his Lucas opin-
ion has vanished. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas 
remain. On the other hand, there seem to be six votes for using Penn 
Central balancing as the dominant mode of takings analysis. Justice 
Brennan, the author of Penn Centra~ seems to have triumphed over 
Justice Scalia from the grave. 
7S Id. (Kennedy. j., concurring) ("[Background principles are] based on objective 
rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved. "). 
74 533 U.S. 606, 616, 620 (2001); see also id. at 626. 'The right to improve property. of 
course. is subject to the reasonable exercise of state authority .... [A] particular exercise of 
the States' regulatory power [however, may be] so unreasonable or onerous as to compel 
compensation." Id. at 627. "Future generations. too, have a right to challenge unreason-
able limitations on the use and value of land." Id. 
75 See supra note 64. 
76 Palaz.zolo, 533 U.S. at 631. 
77 See Ronald H. Rosenberg. The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory 
Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter7, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 
523, 545-48 (1995) (stating that of eighty state court cases citing Lucas over a two-and-a-
half year period. only three relied on it to find a regulatory taking). 
78 Wyerv. Bd. ofEnvtl. Prot., 747 A2d 192. 193 (Me. 2000). 
79 Palaz.zolo. 533 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor. j.. concurring) ("[O]ur decision today does 
not remove the regulatory backdrop against which an owner takes title to property from 
the purview of Penn Central inquiry. It simply restores balance to that inquiry."). 
80 Id. at 636 (O'Connor.j.. concurring). For the full quote. see supra text accompany-
ing note 49. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decline of Justice Scalia's categorical approach to regulatory 
takings jurisprudence, evident in the Palazzolo decision, should mean 
that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency will successfully defend its 
development moratoria in the Lake Tahoe case because the landown-
ers there are claiming a Lucas-type categorical taking.81 But that does 
not mean that some of those landowners could not successfully main-
tain takings claims concerning development restrictions under Penn 
Central balancing, particularly if the Court revisits the size of the 
property issue and disavows the broad approach endorsed by both 
Penn Central and Keystone.82 The decline of categorical analysis and the 
rise of balancing in takings analysis will make for less certainty, more 
litigation, and more case-by-case consideration, not necessarily fewer 
successful takings claims. But those characteristics would seem to be 
inevitable for a constitutional provision whose aim is to do justice and 
produce fairness. 83 
Justice Kennedy's concern for protecting both reasonable regula-
tions and reasonable landowner expectations,84 as well as Justice 
O'Connor's concern for avoiding windfalls85 led both away from Jus-
tice Scalia's categorical absolutism. It is no secret that these two Jus-
tices, who are at the philosophical center of the current Supreme 
Court,86 will decide the future course of Takings Clause litigation. 
They might decide to expand the scope of the regulatory takings doc-
trine by contracting the relevant size of the property, but that would 
seem a unlikely vehicle to ensure full consideration of the reason-
ableness of both the government's restrictions and the landowner's 
expectations because it would encourage the kind of strategic behav-
ior that could produce the windfalls against which Justice O'Connor 
cautioned. 
To effectively guard against landowner windfalls, while consider-
ing the overall fairness of a regulation's effect on a landowner, a large 
81 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 
1477-78 (2002). 
82 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
83 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
84 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
86 In fact, Professor Lazarus considers Justice Kennedy to be the "bellwether Justice in 
environmental cases," with a near 100 percent record for being in the Court majority in 
such cases. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What s Environmental About Environmental Law in the 
Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 715, 733 (2000). 
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view of the relevant property is necessary. This inevitably will mean 
that some large landowners must bear some burdens without com-
pensation for which some small landowners receive compensation. 
But large landowners also derive large benefits from most regulatory 
schemes. The Takings Clause may demand equality of treatment, but 
only of similarly situated landowners. Large and small landowners are 
not similarly situated. As the Court searches for a mechanism to pro-
tect the small, non-strategic behaving landowner from unfair regula-
tory burdens, it ought not to turn away from the Penn Central/Keystone 
view of the size of the property. That large view provides an effective 
guard against economic windfalls. Whatever direction the Court pur-
sues, Palazzolo makes clear that the future of takings doctrine no 
longer lies with the categorical approach championed by Justice 
Scalia. 
POSTSCRIPT 
On April 23, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled, six to three, that 
there was no categorical taking resulting from the imposition of two 
moratoria on development totaling thirty-two months to facilitate 
formulation of a comprehensive land plan for the Lake Tahoe Basin.87 
Justice Stevens' opinion for the six-member majority adopted Justice 
O'Connor's reluctance, as evident in her Palazzolo concurrence,88 to 
extend categorical rules in takings cases.89 In ruling that the case was 
best analyzed under the multi-factor Penn Central framework,9o the 
Court consigned Justice Scalia's Lucas categorical rule to the "ex-
traordinary case in which a regulation permanently deprives property 
of all value .... "91 The Court reiterated that even a decline in value of 
ninety-five percent would require analysis under Penn Central.92 
The Court not only sided with Justice O'Connor's aversion to de-
ciding takings cases according to absolute rules and severely limited 
Justice Scalia's Lucas rule, it also expressly adopted Justice Brennan's 
large view of the relevant parcel, quoting from his Penn Central opin-
ion, as set forth above.93 This seems to indicate that, as predicted 
87 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465 
(2002). 
88 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
89 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478,1486-88. 
90 See supra note 14. 
91 Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484. 
92 [d. at 1483. 
93 [d. at 1481. For the quote from Penn Central, see supra text accompanying note 52. 
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above,94 the Court will not ratify "conceptually severing" property into 
discrete segments for takings purposes, despite Justice Kennedy'S am-
bivalence on this issue in Palazzolo.95 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency thus confirms the assertion that the future 
of the takings doctrine lies in Justice Brennan's multi-factor balanc-
ing, not injustice Scalia's absolutism.96 
94 See supra text following notes 65, 86. 
95 See supra text accompanying note 63. 
96 See supra text following note 80. 
